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ABSTRACT 
Can the PRSP process enhance pro-poor growth in developing countries? This 
question is addressed in a politico-economic framework considering political 
distortions both on the recipient and on the donor side. It turns out that PRSP 
processes can be a very useful tool to enhance pro-poor growth and to raise the 
welfare of the poor. This is the case if the international aid organizations have all 
necessary information to assess the political situation in recipient countries and to 
select the true representatives of the poor into the process. If they do not hold this 
information or if bureaucratic interests and public pressure reduce their incentive to 
obtain or use this information, PRSPs lose their effectiveness in achieving the desired 
objective.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the World Bank’s Research Paper on the “Role and Effectiveness of 
Development Assistance” (Goldin, Rogers and Stern 2002), development co-
operation admittedly showed some failures in the past, but has worked much better 
since the end of the Cold War and is still constantly improving due to a deepened 
focus on poverty and an increased emphasis on local ownership and broad based 
participation.  
 
The centerpiece of this improved development assistance is the elaboration of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which have become a precondition for debt relief 
under the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and other forms 
of concessional financing. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other donors 
expect that this approach will significantly contribute to the objective of reducing 
poverty by half in 2015 codified in the “Millennium Goals” of the international donor 
community (see OECD 2001). In particular, PRSPs are supposed to enhance “pro-
poor-growth”, a recently coined term indicating growth predominantly benefiting the 
poor. 
 
This optimistic view is far from being shared by all observers of the development 
process. In this paper, we question the originality of the objective of “pro-poor-
growth” and analyze the chances of success of the PRSP process from a politico-
economic perspective. Thereby we explicitly focus on the interactions between the 
politico-economic aspects of recipient and donor policies. 
 
Based on Mayer and Mourmoura’s (2002) model of IFI conditionality, we show that 
with a well informed and benevolent IFI, conditioning aid on PRSP processes can be 
a promising alternative to traditional conditionality. The policy in the recipient 
country can be induced to shift towards higher support for pro-poor growth through 
enhanced national ownership of this policy. However, if bureaucratic interest within 
the IFI and pressure from bilateral donors and international NGOs are taken into 
account, this outcome becomes much harder to achieve. 
 
Our approach is influenced by the theoretical literature on the political economy of 
aid. While there is considerable literature on the political economy in developing 
countries, and some literature on donor behavior (see e.g. Vaubel and Willet 1991, 
Kaltefleiter 1995, Michaelowa 1998, Frey 1997, Willet 2000, Lahiri, Raimondos-
Møller 2000 and Michaelowa 2003)1, the literature combining both aspects is rather 
limited. Martens et al. (2002) and Azam and Laffont (2003) are two recent exceptions. 
With this paper, we hope to add some useful insight by stressing the interaction of 
non-benevolent behavior on both sides.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we discuss to what extent the 
objective of “pro-poor-growth” and the PRSP approaches promoted by the IFIs can be 
considered to be really new and original. In section 3 a basic politico-economic model 
will be outlined, and the effects of both traditional development assistance and 
assistance in the context of the PRSP processes will be compared. Section 4 
                                                          
1 For a general overview over the literature on the political economy of development co-operation, see 
Drazen (2000). 
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introduces the IFI’s own bureaucratic interest and public pressures. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. WHAT IS NEW ABOUT “PRO-POOR GROWTH”? 
 
While the broad international agreement on the objective of “pro-poor growth” and its 
operationalization through PRSP processes is considered as a significant step towards 
efficient development co-operation by the IFIs, it does not raise similarly optimistic 
expectations elsewhere. 
 
The objective is certainly laudable - but what is really new about it? Some observers 
of the process have come to ask whether it is the rhetoric, rather than anything else, 
that is really new. “Old wine in new bottles?” is the characteristic title of a recent 
paper examining the issue in the context of the PRSP approach (Cling, 
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2002).  
 
The author stressing most clearly that at least the objective as such is not new is 
William Easterly, himself a former economist at the World Bank. Under the title 
“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”, he presents a table with the history of aid 
policy directions at the Bank. The emphasis on poverty reduction evolved from “far 
greater” in the early 1970s to “even stronger” in 1990, and is now finally “increasing” 
in the new millennium (Easterly 2002, p. 35, quoting McNamara 1973, World Bank 
1990 and IDA 2001). Similarly, ownership has long been accepted as a relevant 
precondition for the sustainability of development efforts. Under various titles such as 
“partnership”, “beneficiary participation”, “community-driven development (CDD)”, 
”empowering the poor”, “consultation of stakeholders” and “bottom up development” 
the issue has been discussed since the early 1960s (Easterly 2002, p. 42). 
 
Easterly argues that the aid bureaucracy has an incentive to obfuscate the 
inefficiencies and failures of the past and to protect itself against criticism by 
continuously emphasizing desirable “new” goals. Therefore: “Like laundry detergent, 
aid is always ‘new and improved’ ” (Easterly 2002, p. 34). Since there are no really 
improved strategies to offer, old strategies are sold under new labels, and traditional 
objectives are periodically reinvented. From Easterly’s sobering point of view, despite 
all rhetoric, the chances for pro-poor growth under PRSP processes are thus not really 
higher than they were ever before (Easterly 2002, p. 43). 
 
Who is right then: the IFIs or its critics? Is there any reason for optimism? In terms of 
what is really new, a relatively broad based consensus has at least emerged on the 
following two issues: 
 
• IFIs today formally recognize the existence of political economic problems within 
recipient countries, recognizing that policy makers might not be completely 
benevolent. This is a rather recent development. Until the late 1980s, during the 
period of the Cold War, such problems may have been noticed but were rarely 
pointed out directly by either the IFIs or other donor organizations in order not to lose 
the political support of the governments concerned at the international level. The 
recognition of the political economy at this level is a relevant precondition for 
channeling the benefits of development co-operation to the poor.  
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• While broad based participation has long been preached by IFIs and other donor 
agencies, it has now become a formal requirement in the context of PRSPs. Since 
PRSPs have themselves become a precondition for almost all concessional financing, 
most of the multilateral and even bilateral development assistance is now effectively 
conditioned on participatory processes. At the same time, traditional conditionality 
based on economic policy has been largely removed (for the case of the HIPC 
initiative, see e.g. Michaelowa 2003). As the new requirements are based on 
processes rather than directly on policies, one may also speak of “process 
conditionality” (Foster et al. 1999).  
 
It can be shown that both points are not independent from each other. Recognizing 
that various interests are involved in the local distribution of aid funds and that 
government are political actors with more complex objectives instead of simple 
welfare maximization, it becomes obvious that the weak position of the poor in the 
political negotiation and decision making process would need to be strengthened 
considerably if they were to benefit from development co-operation. Aiming at the 
empowerment of the poor through process conditionality can thus be considered as a 
logical consequence. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
 
3. THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY AND THE RELEVANCE OF PRSP PROCESSES  
 
Let us consider the situation in the framework of a more abstract politico-economic 
model.2 We will first follow the traditional way of assuming that interest-based 
political processes are only relevant on the recipient side. Therefore a benevolent IFI 
offers loans or grants to enhance pro-poor growth in a developing country. We 
suppose that the IFI maximizes welfare in the world as a whole, i.e. in both donor and 
recipient countries.  
 
The recipient government is taken to be non-benevolent and subject to influences 
from different local interest groups. It maximizes its chances to remain in power and 
its policy decisions therefore depend on their expected impact on the political support 
of the relevant groups in society. To simplify, we consider only two groups, the “rich” 
and the “poor” whose relevance for the government is obviously not the same. In well 
functioning democracies with a majority of poor people we would expect the weight 
of the poor to be relatively high, simply because they could mobilize a large number 
of voters. However, these circumstances are rather rare in developing countries. In 
most of the predominately African countries currently experiencing the PRSP 
processes, the rich tend to have the far greater relevance as a potential threat or 
support to the government. This is based on their proximity to government officials, 
their capacity to influence public opinion, and their capacity to challenge the 
prevailing power structure through economic, financial or military means. The weight 
governments attribute to the welfare of the poor in their political decision making 
process will therefore be rather small in most cases (Boone 1996, Drazen 2000).  
 
This does not mean that all decisions will be taken against the poor. Let the 
government have a bundle of policy instrument, that we call “distortions”, which 
would hinder pro-poor growth. These distortions work to the benefit of the rich but to 
                                                          
2 A technical version of the model and proofs of the arguments lined out here can be found in Hefeker 
and Michaelowa (2003). 
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the detriment of the poor. Examples for this are distortive taxation, tariffs and quotas, 
or inflation that benefit the rich and hurt the poor. It is plausible to assume that the 
marginal utility of the rich decreases while the marginal disutility of the poor 
increases with increasing distortion. Then at some point, even though the poor have 
relatively little political weight, their suffering will become so strong that they 
become a political threat to the government. At the same time, if distortions are 
already high, additional distortions will bring only reduced support from the rich. The 
optimal policy for a government maximizing its chances to remain in office will then 
obviously be the level of distortions at which the increased additional threat through 
the poor just balances the additional support by the rich. This is the naturally 
prevailing “political equilibrium” in the recipient country. 
 
In contrast to the government, the IFI does not undervalue the welfare of the poor and 
therefore considers this political equilibrium as being unacceptable. Its objective is to 
increase pro-poor growth by reducing distortions. To reach this objective it can use 
the instrument of development assistance which may be unconditional, conditioned on 
policies (traditional conditionality), or conditioned on PRSP processes (process 
conditionality). Let us consider these situations one by one. 
 
Unconditional aid 
 
Can unconditional aid change the political equilibrium in the recipient country? 
Indeed, it can to the extent that the inflow of development funds interacts with the 
marginal utility or disutility of distortions. It appears plausible to assume that the 
negative impact of distortions for the poor becomes even stronger when aid is 
increased. That is, the negative effect increases in absolute terms. The reason is that 
with more funds available for pro-poor growth, the opportunity cost of distortions will 
increase. If, at the same time, the positive effect of distortions on the welfare of the 
rich decreases, development co-operation will automatically lead to reduced 
distortions and enhanced pro-poor growth (Mayer and Mourmouras 2002).  
 
Unfortunately, aid funds can also be used to create additional rents from a given 
distortion (Boone 1996, Svensson 2000). This leads us to assume that the rich group’s 
marginal utility of distortions may increase rather than decrease with increasing 
development assistance. If the weight of the welfare of the rich in the government’s 
utility function is sufficiently high this will lead to a new political equilibrium at an 
even higher level of distortions than before. Even if the aid funds as such contribute 
positively to the welfare of the poor, the new level of distortions indirectly provoked 
by the inflow of these funds may outweigh this positive effect. This actually implies 
that unconditional aid can become counterproductive and be to the disadvantage of 
the poor.3
 
Aid conditioned on policies (traditional conditionality) 
 
To avoid this undesirable effect, IFIs have long tried to condition aid on particular 
policies, i.e. in the case of our model, on the level of distortions. The developing 
country government is generally interested to receive aid since both the rich and the 
poor benefit from it at a given level of distortions. This implies that any increase in 
                                                          
3 This result is consistent with the empirical studies on aid effectiveness by Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
and World Bank (1998). 
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aid will enhance political support for the government. In order to receive aid, the 
government is therefore ready to accept a certain reduction in distortions, even if this 
goes hand in hand with a loss of political support by the rich which cannot be fully 
compensated by the higher support of the poor. If the IFI knows the government’s 
preferences, it can specify its development funds per level of distortions in a way that 
the government becomes just indifferent between the two options. This leads to an 
agreement between the IFI and the government that involves the maximum reduction 
in distortions compatible with the government’s self interest.  
 
Unfortunately, there is a serious problem with the reliability of the government’s 
commitment. Once the IFI has delivered its financial assistance, the government has 
no more incentive to remain at the agreed level of distortions. In the absence of an 
effective enforcement mechanism, the IFI has no means to ensure compliance. In fact, 
the lack of compliance to formally agreed conditions was frequently observed and this 
even though aid was often delivered in tranches (see e.g. Hermes and Lesink 2001, 
p. 7; Morrissey 2001, p. 28; White and Morrissey 1997, pp. 500f. and 502f.). 
 
What we observe, in other words, is a problem of lacking ownership: The government 
agrees to implement a certain policy because this is the only way it can obtain the aid 
funds, but it does not find this policy desirable as such.4 Thus traditional 
conditionality is generally ineffective because there is no commitment by the recipient 
government. 
 
Aid conditioned on PRSP processes (process conditionality) 
 
To mitigate some of these problems, the IFIs have recently introduced “process 
conditionality” (Booth 2001, p. 3). While traditional conditionality focuses on 
outcomes, process conditionality focuses on “processes” (Foster at al. 1999) or 
“actions” (Dixit 2000). Developing countries are requested to initiate a broad based 
participatory process in order to elaborate their PRSPs if they want to receive 
financial assistance.  
 
In order to analyze the effect of conditioning aid on these processes, we need to define 
what “broad based participation” could actually mean. As many other terms used in 
the context of development assistance, the meaning of this term is not very precise 
leading to different expectations by different people. 
 
One problem is that it remains unclear what the condition of “participation” in PRSP 
processes means in terms of the potential range between full decision making power 
and simple information rights. Is it “participation” when civil society groups etc. are 
simply gathered and informed about the policies? Is it “participation” when they are 
involved in the debates, but without any binding commitment that their opinion will 
finally be taken into account by policy makers? Does “participation” require that the 
groups involved will finally take the decisions themselves?  
 
Moreover, the term “broad based” is not an operational concept either. One 
interpretation frequently found in the aid community and reflected in the literature 
(Maxwell 2003, p. 15; Marshall and Woodroffe 2001, pp. 10f.; Morrissey 2001, p. 14) 
                                                          
4 For an interesting general discussion of the difficulties to reconcile conditionality and ownership, see 
Drazen (2001).  
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is that participation should be maximised, i.e. that all relevant stakeholders should be 
involved in the PRSP process. The idea is that only if all relevant stakeholders come 
together and reach a joint agreement on future policies, they will really own these 
policies so that the latter become sustainable 
 
Unfortunately, this kind of “broad based participation” is simply not feasible. If taken 
seriously as a requirement to reach a consensus among all relevant stakeholders about 
a wide range of macroeconomic, social and institutional reforms of which some will 
benefit and others will lose, it is hard to imagine how this requirement could ever be 
met (Morrissey 2001, p.14). In countries without basic democratic structures even the 
selection of representatives is a considerable challenge. Because it is difficult to 
imagine that the IFIs are not aware of this problem, we believe that their interpretation 
of the “broad based participatory PRSP process” might actually be a different one.  
 
One possible interpretation  of the idea of PRSP processes is  that more influence 
should be given specifically (and exclusively) to those groups who directly benefit 
from pro-poor growth. This interpretation implies that “broad based participation” 
does not include everybody, but only those who are the intended beneficiaries of 
policy reform.  
 
A closer look into the World Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook reveals that IFIs have indeed 
relatively clear ideas about which groups to include and which groups to exclude from 
the discussion process. The choice is deliberately selective and there is no intention to 
include all. In the context of education sector reform, for instance, the Sourcebook 
suggests “isolating or working around cost bearers or opposition groups such as 
teachers’ unions by building alliances with other stakeholders, such as parents and 
communities, school principals, and the business community” (World Bank 2002, 
p. 270).  
 
While an IFI prescribed preselection of the groups to be included in the participatory 
process appears to be at odds with the professed emphasis of the PRPS process to be 
“country driven”, this contradiction does not seem worse to us than in the case of 
economic policies in general. Economic policies as well are supposed to be developed 
by the recipient country, but it is clear that only policy proposals acceptable for the 
IMF and the World Bank will lead to the PRSP to be endorsed and the aid funds to be 
released.  
 
If the government agrees to aid conditioned on the PRSP process, the selected groups 
can send their representatives to participate in discussions about the national poverty 
strategy with government officials, politicians and relevant civil servants as well as 
IFI representatives. Participation in these discussions increases the contacts of these 
groups, raises their opportunities for networking, and gives them access to the media. 
The result is an empowerment of the selected groups, which can be reinforced by 
additional measures such as alphabetization or courses on legal rights to help them 
take full advantage of their new opportunities. 
 
The empowerment of some selected groups will obvious change the distribution of 
relative political powers in the recipient country. In terms of our model where only 
two groups are considered, this would imply that the interests of the poor become 
more important for the government. Once the poor have obtained more political 
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weight, the government will consider more favorably any policy that increases their 
welfare. Consequently, the government will now set a lower level of growth reducing 
distortions for any given level of development assistance.  
 
If the participatory process is successful, the pro-poor policies are in the government’s 
own interest which also solves the problem of lack of ownership. It should be noted 
that this is true despite the fact that the government would have never chosen these 
policies ex ante, before the aid inflow conditioned on the PRSP process let to the 
empowerment of the poor and thereby changed the political weights attributed to the 
two groups. However, if the government “owns” these policies ex post, this is 
sufficient to ensure the sustainability of reform. 
 
Under the assumptions outlined above, conditioning aid on PRSP processes thus 
appears to be a relevant tool to enhance aid effectiveness for the poor. Moreover, it 
can be shown that IFIs can actually formulate policies in such a way that process 
conditionality leads to exactly the same result as traditional conditionality if it were 
enforceable (Hefeker and Michaelowa 2003, Figure 5). 
 
Note that the interpretation of “broad based participation” being selective (as opposed 
to all inclusive) is crucial for the above result. If all competing groups experience the 
same promotion through the participatory process no specific empowerment of the 
poor will take place, their political weight will remain unchanged, and the overall 
political equilibrium will not be altered to their benefit. Similarly, if the government 
itself decides on whom to include into the process – a country driven approach in the 
purest sense – it has no incentive to change the existing weights, and chances to 
change the prevailing political equilibrium are minimal.  
 
4. THE DONOR SIDE  
 
We shall now relax the assumption that problems of political economy arise 
exclusively in the recipient country. The IFI is no longer representing the interest of 
the world as a whole. As suggested by Willet (2000), its policy preferences are biased 
by bureaucratic interest and public pressure through donor governments and 
international NGOs.  
 
In a first step, we shall consider that international bureaucracies tend to behave as 
budget maximizers. In a second step, we shall analyze the influence of NGOs and 
bilateral donor governments. 
 
The IFI as a budget maximizer 
 
If the IFI has an interest in maximizing its budget, this implies that it needs to at least 
fully disburse the funds currently at its disposal. In fact, the disbursement of all 
available funds may even be a necessary condition for preserving the current budget 
and staff. It is therefore no surprise that the disbursement objective is frequently 
reported by observers of the aid business (e.g. Easterly 2002, Mosley 1996, Vaubel 
1991).  
 
If the IFI does not confine itself to the maximization of world welfare but 
simultaneously maximizes aid disbursements, this part of its interest will completely 
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coincide with the interest of the recipient government. This implies that effective 
development assistance will clearly be higher than before, a fact that will 
unambiguously enhance the recipient government’s utility. As long as the poor are 
only weakly represented in the government’s utility function, it cannot be excluded, 
however, that all benefits from more aid will be channeled to the rich while the poor 
are worse off than before. This is because – as discussed above – increasing aid 
(without enforceable conditionality) generally goes hand in hand with increasing 
distortions. 
 
Conditioning aid on PRSP processes can again ensure that the benefits of the recipient 
government do not arise to the detriment of the poor. As the poor become more 
important for the considerations of the government, its preference for distortions 
becomes smaller and more aid may then even imply decreasing distortions. In this 
case, an increase in aid becomes unambiguously beneficial for the poor.  
 
It should be noted that in the case of a budget maximizing aid bureaucracy, the IFI’s 
and the recipient government’s overall preferences coincide in their aims to disburse 
as much aid as possible. Bilateral donors therefore need to closely monitor the IFI’s 
spending behavior and to define a budget constraint determining the maximum 
amount of aid the IFI can disburse. 
 
We can conclude that under bureaucratic budget maximization, more aid will be 
disbursed while the general functioning of PRSP processes remains unchanged. As 
higher aid volumes are involved, it becomes even more relevant that these are spent to 
the benefit of the poor and do not lead to higher distortions. Taking into account 
bureaucratic budget maximization therefore strengthens the case for process 
conditionality. 
 
The IFI under external pressure 
 
So far we have assumed that the IFI knows who best represents the interests of the 
poor and uses PRSP processes to increase their weight in the recipient country’s 
political process. In reality, however, the situation in developing countries is complex 
so that the best representatives of the poor might not always be easy to identify. There 
are often numerous groups claiming this role. All of them know that being able to 
participate in the PRSP process will increase their political influence and the attention 
the government will pay to their points of view.  
 
Even within the donor community, there is generally no unanimity with respect to 
which groups should or should not be empowered in the context of PRSPs. 
International NGOs have often complained that local civil society organizations – 
often their own local partners – have not sufficiently been integrated into the 
discussions (see e.g. Marshall and Woodroffe 2001, pp. 10f.). Complaints by local 
groups whose intention to participate was declined are taken up by various interest 
groups in the donor countries as well as by external researchers. Even in the case of 
Uganda which is frequently cited as one of the most successful countries with respect 
to the implementation of the PRSP process, numerous groups are dissatisfied with 
their integration into the related discussions (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003, pp. 102f.).  
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Consider the above mentioned example of education sector reform. While the World 
Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook reveals the Bank’s firm position that teacher unions’ 
influence is detrimental to the implementation of an efficient educational strategy, one 
might also argue that teacher unions are the most knowledgeable representatives of 
poor students’ interests when to develop a policy of enhanced educational quality. It is 
almost certain that there will be at least one international NGO, such as an industrial 
country teachers’ union with interests in development issues, that will lobby for the 
inclusion of teacher unions in the PRSP discussions. 
 
Since poverty reduction is a multidimensional goal and there is even no consensus on 
what actually constitutes a pro-poor growth strategy (Morrissey 2001, p. 14; Klasen 
2001, p. 1), it is easy for lobby groups of various backgrounds and interests to claim 
the relevance of their partners for an efficient poverty reduction strategy. Thus, like 
NGOs, commercial or political interest groups in donor countries may lobby for the 
inclusion of groups with whom they cooperate. Examples could be multinationals 
interested in exploiting resources in the developing country or firms that sell arms or 
luxury items to the rich “elites”. 
 
Moreover, it is conceivable that donors are influenced directly by the position of the 
recipient government. Given the difficulties to assess the political situation in (mostly 
far away) developing countries, political actors in donor countries, including both aid 
agencies and NGOs, might argue that the representatives of the poor can be 
determined correctly only within the recipient country itself. This argument seems to 
be well in line with the IFIs’ own assertion that PRSPs should be fully “country 
driven”. For simplicity, and because they lack other relevant channels of information 
about developments in the recipient country, donor governments may thus adopt their 
partner government’s position. This will tend to stabilize rather then to change the 
prevailing power structures in the recipient country.  
 
Even if the IFI knows the “real” representatives of the poor, it will tend to take into 
account the position of other relevant actors too. Permanent pressure from bilateral 
donor institutions or international NGOs could deteriorate the IFI bureaucrats’ 
working climate. Moreover, in the long run, dissatisfaction of bilateral donors may 
lead to reductions in the IFI’s budget. The IFI therefore has a strong incentive to 
integrate at least partly the positions of NGOs and bilateral donor governments into its 
own policy stance to avoid too much criticism and external pressure.  
 
Interestingly, some observers of the PRSP process have noted that despite the rhetoric 
of “empowerment”, IFIs themselves appear to be very reticent when it comes to a 
concrete description of political power structures or political mechanisms. They tend 
to prefer the technical and juridical arguments, even if the matter in case is purely 
political (Craig and Porter 2003). Technical advise is where they are supposed to have 
their comparative advantage and where bilateral donor governments on whom they 
depend financially expect them to excel. Bilateral donors would hardly accept debates 
with IFIs about purely political issues. This may increase the IFIs’ readiness to accept 
bilateral donor and NGO positions with respect to the inclusion of different groups 
into the PRSP decision making process. 
 
One might also argue that the IFI itself is not always sure of who are the real 
representatives of the poor. Alternatively, the IFI might be well able to find out the 
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right group to support, but this process might take more time than the IFI is willing to 
invest. There is ample evidence on “hurry-up lending” (Vaubel 1991) and rushed aid 
disbursements or debt forgiveness such as in the context of PRSP processes linked to 
the HIPC initiative (Michaelowa 2003, p. 472; Marshall and Woodroffe 2001, p. 10; 
Booth 2001, p. 18). Even the official IDA/IMF (2002, pp. 8 and 24) review of the 
PRSP approach acknowledges this problem. In all these cases, orienting the IFI’s 
policy at the bilateral donors’ position will at least provide it with some immunity 
against later criticism.5  
 
What is the implication of all this for the effectiveness of process conditionality? 
Apparently, there exists a considerable risk to select the wrong representatives into 
the PRSP process. In the extreme case, if empowerment through participation is 
targeted to the rich instead of the poor, distortions in the new political equilibrium 
will be higher than before and higher even than in the case of unconditional aid. If the 
involvement of different groups follows the recipient government’s suggestions, no 
deviation from the already prevailing political situation can be expected at all. In both 
cases, aid will increase distortions. The IFI’s budget maximization behavior further 
exacerbates this problem. Targeting the true representatives of the poor and selecting 
those (and only those) into the PRSP process is crucial for the effectiveness of process 
conditionality for pro-poor growth. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
While “pro-poor growth” cannot convincingly be presented as a new objective, formal 
conditioning of aid on the participation of the poor in the developing country’s 
political decision making process (process conditionality) is a truly innovative tool 
associated with current PRSPs. In developing countries whose governments do not 
sufficiently value the welfare of the poor, the effectiveness of this instrument depends 
on its capacity to alter the prevailing political equilibrium.  
 
It turns out that if the IFI is benevolent, if it knows the right policy mix required to 
enhance pro-poor growth, if it also knows who represents the poor, and if it resists 
external pressure from bilateral donors and NGOs, it can indeed fruitfully use the new 
instrument and promote pro-poor growth. This result also holds if the IFI is not fully 
benevolent but seeks to maximize its own budget. In this case, aid disbursements are 
particularly high which further increases the relevance of conditioning aid on PRSP 
processes. All that needs to be done from the bilateral donors’ side is to monitor aid 
disbursements and to enforce certain budget limitations on the IFI. 
 
If the IFI knows the policy mix required to enhance pro-poor growth and also knows 
the groups representing the poor, but does not resist external pressure, the situation 
becomes different. Rising distortions, reduced growth and a negative effect of aid on 
the poor cannot be excluded. If the empowerment induced by the PRSP process is ill-
targeted, this may push the political equilibrium into the wrong direction. Since the 
IFI knows who should be promoted, but simply does not enforce its point of view 
against the bilateral donors’ position (or the one of international NGOs), it would be 
                                                          
5 Note that this pressure has probably increased in recent years, where several commissions have been 
active to investigate the role and function of IFIs (see Hefeker 2003). Since most tend to be quite 
critical of the IFIs, they have any incentive to try to please donor governments by taking their positions 
more strongly into consideration. 
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necessary to make the IFI more independent from these influences, e.g. by changing 
their governance or financing structure.  
 
If the IFI does not have the relevant information, the situation is again different. As 
before, a negative effect of aid on the poor cannot be excluded. However, in this case 
the solution is not to increase the IFI’s independence. To the contrary, the influence of 
external institutions with better knowledge should be strengthened. The problem is to 
find these. Can NGOs be expected to have a better understanding of the situation in 
recipient countries? This may be true in some cases, but certainly not in general. 
Developing country governments are certainly not the right “experts” to consider, 
either. It cannot be expected that they will reveal anything which would call for a 
move away from the already prevailing political equilibrium. Any impulse to change 
this equilibrium must be exogenous. 
 
In some cases, the IFI may be able to acquire itself the relevant information through 
more thorough investigation. The IFI should then be encouraged to undertake this 
additional effort. What is most important are safeguards against “hurry-up lending” or 
“hurry-up disbursements” driven by the objective of budget maximization. Moreover, 
selectivity may help in the sense that PRSP processes should be started only in those 
countries where the necessary information to ensure that the political equilibrium is 
moved into the right direction is available.  
 
Unfortunately, even these recommendations only represent partial solutions to the 
general problem. Moreover, they are case-specific and partly contradictory. It may be 
difficult to find out whether the IFI does not hold the necessary information or 
whether it does not put it forward due to external pressure. However, the 
consequences for the desirability of IFI independence would be just the opposite.  
 
All in all, it appears that under realistic assumptions, aid conditioned on PRSP 
processes will not necessarily be effective in terms of pro-poor growth, and may even 
become counterproductive. This rather pessimistic scenario suggests that Easterly 
(2002) might be right: With the “new” objective of “pro-poor growth” and the 
instrument of PRSPs, the aid community has again announced a considerable and 
innovative reform, but unfortunately, chances for significantly improved results still 
remain very limited. 
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